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The following case-study reports the situation involving Royal Philips, Philips Lighting and the 
fictitious Hedge Fund AMS Capital Portfolio Manager, Luuk de Vries, as of May, 2016. The 
structure is divided between the case story and a teaching note. Present in the case story, the 
events involving the three parties until Philips Lighting is carved-out from Royal Philips and 
listed trough an IPO are reported. The teaching note intends to tackle de Vries’ question of 
buying or not on the IPO and to understand the reasoning behind carving-out. The teaching note 
closes favouring the buy and flip the stock strategy. 
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AMS Capital & Philips Lighting: Will de Vries be the Genius of the Lamp? 
 
April 25th, 2016, 7 a.m. and Luuk de Vries, recent Portfolio Manager hired by AMS Capital, a 
Dutch hedge fund, was already reading Financial Times seeking for new investment 
opportunities. AMS Capital was recently registering poor results in its investments and de Vries 
wanted to leverage his reputation within the fund by proposing an excellent investment 
opportunity. While rushing through the newspaper, he stared at the following heading: “Philips 
likely to list its lighting business: Spin-off is consistent with plans to simplify the once-
sprawling Dutch conglomerate”. De Vries had expertise in the M&A world, especially in 
transactions such as spin-offs, divestitures and other restructurings. He proceeded to read the 
news: 
“Philips is close to floating its lighting unit after management at the Dutch 
conglomerate admitted that an initial public offering was “more likely” than a hoped-for sale 
to a trade buyer. Philips’ shares fell 5.5 per cent on Monday after it reported a sharp fall in net 
income for the first quarter of this year, mainly due to one-off tax charges related to the planned 
spin-off. The company had considered selling its lighting unit — which analysts estimate to be 
worth up to €5.5bn — over the past year as part of plans to slim down the conglomerate and 
focus on its healthcare business. Management said for the first time on Monday that an IPO 
was now the probable option, although negotiations with potential purchasers are still 
ongoing.” 
April 25, 2016, Financial Times 
By the time he had finished reading the news, he was sure that this could be the chance to put 
back on track AMS Capital. He had approximately one month to gather all the information 
necessary to prove and convince Vincent Schuuring, Chief Investement Officer of AMS 
Capital, that this could be the great opportunity.  
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Philips’ journey: From light revolution to technology disruption  
 
During Industrial Revolution's era, light bulbs industry was undoubtedly growing fast and so 
were Gerard Philips’ experiments in making reliable carbon filament lamps. Grounded on this, 
and moved by innovation and entrepreneurship, in 1891, Frederik Philips and his son, Gerard 
Philips, purchased a small factory in Eindhoven, the Netherlandsi. It was there where Philips & 
Co. started and where Frederik and Gerard Philips could offer light bulbs to everyone who 
needed them. Philips rapidly became one of the largest producers of carbon-filament lamps in 
Europe and was pretty much focused on exportation. 
In September 11, 1912, Philips & Co went public and its shares started being publicly traded at 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. After the IPO, the initial limited partnership named Philips & 
Co was from that moment on a limited liability company whose name changed to N.V. Philips’ 
Gloeilampenfabrieken. 
Philips’ business quickly started expanding to new areas. Frederik Philips sent an advertisement 
to the newspaper asking for a “capable young scientist with a doctorate in physics”ii. The 
purpose of that initial expansion was to study physical and chemical phenomena and stimulate 
product innovation. Until that time, Philips’ strategy did not rely on creating new original ideas 
but rather on developing and improving already existing inventions. It happens that, by 1912, 
patent law protection was re-introduced in the Netherlandsiii, which complicated and wagged 
the bases where Philip’s business strategy relied on until then. For that precise reason, Philips 
had to invent, create and diversify.  
It was in 1918, when Philips introduced the medical X-ray tube in the market, signalling the 
beginning of the diversification of Philips’ products. By that time, their products would widely 
range from X-ray radiation to radio reception. As of the 1920’s, Royal Philips was established 
as the primary holding company. In 1932, Philips was already the largest manufacturer of radios 
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worldwide and seven years later, in 1939, Philips was launching the pioneering rotary electric 
shaveriv. But the greatest years of technological breakthroughs for Philips would start in the 
post-World War II years, between the 40’s and the 70’s. In 1949 Philips stepped into the 
medicine field, introducing the Philips Synchrocyclotron, enabling research into the treatment 
of malignant tumours. Years later, in 1972, Philips decided to list itself also in the New York 
Stock Exchange. 
Philips innovation path was just in the beginning. The company stepped in the 70’s betting in 
the processing, storage and transmission of images, sound and data. But alongside the organic 
growth it was experiencing, Philips also started relying on inorganic growth through 
acquisitions. In 1974, Philips acquired Magnavox, a North American factory of electronic 
devices such as radios and televisions and in the following years more acquisitions took place: 
Signetics (1975), GTE Sylvania (1981) and Westinghouse (1983). The result of such 
investment in the industry of sound, image and data was the launch of the Compact Disc (CD) 
in 1983. However, when trying to introduce the CD-Interactive for television, the project failed, 
leading Philips to register losses of $2.7 billion in 1990 and $500 million in 1993v. The major 
cause for such financial fall was the big competition Philips was facing in the audio and video 
industry especially from Matsushita and Sony.  
Thus, in the 90’s, Philips’ business strategy changed significantlyvi. Philips narrowed the 
number of areas in which it operated, focusing more on the healthcare industry. By 1988 Philips 
was registering annual revenues of €25.447 billion and reached its peak in 2000 with €37.862 
billionvii (see Exhibit 1&2 for Philips’ revenues and stock performance). In 2005, Philips 
acquired Stentor, a provider of picture archiving and communication systems that would 
ultimately help storing, managing and distributing digital radiology images throughout 
hospitals and healthcare facilities, but also divested in certain businesses related to lighting, 
such as TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), and to image and sound such 
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as the IT company Atos Origin and Great Nordic. These spin-offs ended up being a success for 
the investors who invested in them at the very startviii.   
Focusing on healthcare allowed Philips to launch in 2006 the first 3D scanner in order to further 
enhance image quality of CT scans. Along with this, Philips also started searching for solutions 
to minimally-invasive surgeries. As stated in Philips’ 2008 Annual Reportix, “Philips continued 
its journey to become a health and well-being company”. From the total acquisitions’ 
integration and purchase accounting charges of €146 million in 2008, €95 million were just 
from the healthcare segmentx.  
As of 2015, Koninklijke Philips N.V. (or Royal Philips), the holding company of the Philips 
Group, was still present in four segments: healthcare, lighting, consumer lifestyle and 
innovation, group and services. The group employed approximately 113,959 employeesxi and 
was present in more than 100 countries totalling an Enterprise Value of €25.707 billion. In that 
same financial year, Philips registered revenues of € 24.244 billion (an increase of 13.3% over 
the financial year of 2014) and an EBITDA of €3.139 billion (see Exhibits 3, 4, 5 & 6 for Royal 
Philips historical financial statements). The contribution of each segment to the overall Philips’ 
financial performance in 2015 was mostly driven by the healthcare business. The healthcare 
segment contributed with €10.912 billion in sales (increased 18.8% from previous financial 
year), followed by the lightning sector totalling €7.411 billion in revenues (increased 7.9% from 
previous financial year), the consumer lifestyle segment contributing with €5.347 billion 
(increased 13% from previous financial year) and finally the innovation, group and services 
which recorded revenues of €574 million (increased 5.1% from previous financial year) (see 
Exhibit 7 for  operational segmentation & 8 for Philips Group 2015 equity and debt 






Luuk de Vries started his career at the age of 22 when he was admitted at Goldman Sachs in 
Amsterdam as an M&A analyst. During his journey there, he was able to get into several 
projects related to spin-offs, divestitures and some other restructurings. De Vries stayed there 
for ten years and the learning and knowledge he retrieved from his first job were immense. 
Despite being successful at his job and being passionate about the M&A world, de Vries wanted 
to try something new where he could possibly add value with his knowledge. In January 2016, 
at the age of 32, de Vries was hired as Portfolio Manager at AMS Capital, a hedge fund 
headquartered in Amsterdam. AMS Capital main strategy was to usually invest in distressed 
companies on the verge of bankruptcy by buying the company’s junk bonds at a very low price 
and selling them at a much higher price or alternatively, becoming a shareholder of the company 
after the restructuring process. 
AMS Capital had been for years a renowned player in the Dutch hedge fund industry but in 
more recent years had been struggling for positive performance results. De Vries had just landed 
in his new job and the last thing he wanted was to work in a place with decaying reputation. 
Hence, he started looking in the market for good investment opportunities that could potentially 
leverage again AMS Capital reputation in the Dutch hedge fund industry. However, a bad 
recommendation could be critical for de Vries’ reputation.  
When rushing through all the news, he read that Royal Philips was about to carve-out and list 
its lighting business, through an IPO, by mid-2016. This move was frequently named by the 
press as a spin-off, but in fact, it was more similar to an equity carve-out. From his knowledge 
in spin-offs, he knew that shares of spun-off companies tended to perform very well and were 
a good source of short-term profits. To re-assure himself that he was right, he rushed to his 
Bloomberg terminal to see the past performances of spin-offs (see Exhibit 9). The results were 
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along with what most studies find: spun-off companies out-perform the marketxiii. De Vries also 
knew that this investment was not in line with the usual investment policy of AMS Capital but 
would the investment become a success and he would for sure be promoted in the near future. 
It was then time to convince the Chief Investment Officer, Vincent Schuuring, to invest in 
Philips Lighting shares. 
Light and Lighting Bulbs Industry 
 
It goes back to the 1870’s when the first experiments, to build a lighting bulb, conducted by 
Thomas Edison and Joseph Swan took place. Throughout the years, the main goal within this 
industry was to constantly develop and create new methods to build more efficient light bulbs 
that could last longer at a lower production cost. This market grew and innovated itself at a high 
pace. From fluorescent lamps to compact fluorescent lamps (CFL) the market was expanding 
to satisfy the needs of a growing population. When stepping into the 21st century, one of the 
fastest develop lighting technologies was the light-emitting diode (LED) bulbxiv. It presented 
itself as the most efficient light on the market (see Exhibit 10 for comparison of different types 
of light bulbs)xv. Despite being a growing industry, customers were sensitive to prices.  In mid-
1980’s, the first CFLs introduced in the market were being sold at retail prices of $25-35 which 
made consumers react very negatively. Only after almost 30 years later would new CFL bulbs 
be created and be sold at a unitary cost of $1.74. 
Since previous years that was quite clear to see that the global lighting market had a positive 
high correlation with the global GDP (see Exhibit 11)xvi which to a certain extent helped to 
better understand the future of this industry. Whereas the conventional lamps industry showed 
to be a consolidated industry with major players being General Electrics, Osram and Philipsxvii, 
the LED lighting market presented itself to be a very dynamic one with fierce competition from 
Asian countries. In recent years, countries worldwide had been adopting political measures in 
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what regarded specific technologies in the lighting market. The EU began to accelerate the 
switchover to more ecological lighting sources by extending its regulations to ban low-voltage 
halogen lampsxviii. That posed a risk to the future of traditional lighting bulbs in the market.  
By 2010, the overall lighting market registered approximately $99 billion in revenues and four 
years later, in 2014, registered $112 billion. The main growth drivers, in geographic terms, were 
China and Latin America accounting in 2014 for approximately 70% of the market share. The 
same analysis was applied to the lamp market (a sub-sector of the lighting market) that had 
revenues of approximately $15 billion and two years later saw its value increase to 
approximately $17 billion (see Exhibit 12 for the outlook of both the Lighting and Lamp 
markets)xix. Despite such increase, the fact that modern lamps could last much longer was 
causing a reduction in the number of times a customer had to switch lamps. Furthermore, the 
LED sector was experiencing a price erosionxx where prices were expected to drop from €4.52 
in 2014 to €2.26 in 2020 (a 50% drop)xxi. Revenues in the lighting sector were forecasted to 
grow at 3% annually mainly driven by LED-based solutionsxxii.  
As of 2016 the lighting market had a broad range of products: conventional lamps 
(incandescent, halogen, fluorescent and HID lamps); LED lamps; Luminaires (electrical 
devices that produce, control and distribute light); Electronics (units which regulate the current 
going through a light source); lighting systems (combination of luminaires, controls and 
software) and other lighting systemsxxiii. 
Healthcare Industry 
 
The growth this sector was experiencing was immense, especially due to its combination with 
technology (healthtech) and by 2002, its worldwide market size was approximately $304.606 
billionxxiv. The Healthcare industry presented to be very capital intensive as the total spending 
in this sector accounted for 10.4% of the total world GDP in 2015, which corresponded to 
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approximately $7 trillionxxv. Alongside the sector’s growth, M&A activity in this sector was 
also rising (see Exhibit 13 for related big deals). In the past recent years, it had been observed 
that chronic diseases were rising with special focus to cardiovascular, cancer and respiratory 
diseases. Life expectancy had been increasing, causing bigger efforts and investments to treat 
more and more citizens.  Reaching 2016, the major trends in the healthcare industry were the 
rising drugs’ prices (rise of 9% in generics in 2014), the business consolidation through 
numerous mergers (following the trend of 2015), the appearance of health apps such as Teladoc 
which saw its membership increase from 1.9 million in 2013 to 8.1 million in 2014, derived 
from the market penetration of health apps, cybersecurity was becoming more important than 
ever and finally, more and more, healthcare was becoming a political aspect especially between 
republicans and democrats in the USAxxvi.  
In 2016, this sector reached a market size of $703.647 billion, reflecting a growth rate of 131% 
between 2002 and 2016 (see Exhibit 14)xxvii. Even though, this sector was still in need for more 
innovation and, as of 2016, governments, health plans and life science companies were 
experiencing higher costs with inconsistent resultsxxviii. 
Philips plans to split itself in two: 
 
It was September 2014, and Philips took the strategic decision to sell its lighting businessxxix.  
The Dutch Conglomerate announced its interest in splitting Philips into two companies: one 
focused on healthcare and technology (healthtech), and the other one on lightingxxx. The group 
believed each sector had its particular customer needs, trends and value drivers. According to 
Philips, the management team was still trying to figure out if an IPO would be more beneficial 
or not for shareholder value creation than a direct sale to an investorxxxi: 
“I do appreciate the magnitude of the decision we are taking, but the time is right to 
take the next strategic step for Philips, as we continue on our transformation, to become the 
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global leader in HealthTech and shape the future of the industry, we will combine our vibrant 
Healthcare and Consumer Lifestyle businesses into one company. At the same time, giving 
independence to our Lighting solutions business will better enable it to expand its global 
leadership position and venture into adjacent market opportunities.” 
Frans van Houten, Royal Philips CEO, London meeting, Sep. 2014 
Philips’ shares had been underperforming the market and were down 9% in 2014. After 
becoming public Philips’ intention to sell its lighting business, its shares rose to €24.07 in 
Amsterdamxxxii, reflecting an increase of approximately 4%. 
Philips had already previous intentions to divest the lighting business. As of 2014, Royal Philips 
combined the Philips Lumileds LED components and automotive lighting components 
operations into a stand-alone companyxxxiii. Plus, Philips tried to sell an 80.1% stake of 
Lumileds to a consortium led by GO Scale Capital, a Chinese investment fund, which was 
offering $2.9 billion for the business stakexxxiv. Despite strong efforts by both parties to seal the 
deal, the US authorities did not authorize the salexxxv. According to Philips, the company was 
not allowed to disclose the real reasons for such deny by the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS), despite the major publicly known cause being concerns with 
national securityxxxvi. Such failure in the sale of Lumileds acted as a sort of repellent for 
potential buyers for the lighting businessxxxvii. Hence, only after more than half a year did Philips 
announced the IPO, after failing to find a buyerxxxviii. 
The separation was publicly announced on the 12th of March 2015, when Frans van Houten, 
Philips’ CEO and Chairman of the Board of Management since 2011, announced that Philips 
was planning to sell its lightning business to the public through an IPO on Euronext Amsterdam 
which would take place the following yearxxxix. Despite becoming two separate distinct 
companies, both (Royal Philips Electronics and Philips Lighting) would launch new products 
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under the same brand: Philips. A brand that had strong reputation and that in 2015, for the fourth 
year in a row, was considered the most preferred one in LED lighting globally, both in 
professional and consumer categoriesxl.  
After the split, Royal Philips would run the Healthcare and Consumer Lifestyle businesses 
alone, while Philips Lighting would run separately the lighting business with four main 
different business groups: BG Lamps (the one corresponding to traditional lamps), BG LED, 
BG Professional and BG Home. However, the Lumileds would still continue to be part of Royal 
Philips. The parent company wanted to seek other strategic options to attract capital from third 
party investors for Lumiledsxli. Thus, any transaction related to that business would go for the 
account of Royal Philipsxlii. Despite a separation from the lighting business and Lumileds, both 
entities established a strategic partnership and supply agreement1 whereby one was supplier of 
each other (Lumileds would supply LED components and Philips Lighting would supply other 
lighting components)xliii.    
The market participants debated on the reasons behind the split. Frans van Houten assured that, 
first of all, the proceeds from the IPO would be used to finance the growth on the healthcare 
businessxliv. Secondly, that sale could help to eliminate the so well-known conglomerate 
discount, benefiting Philips’s future valuations. Hans Slob, Rabobank analyst, corroborated 
saying “it will eliminate the conglomerate discount, I always used a 5 percent discount for the 
sum of the parts valuation”xlv. 
According to what was agreed in a shareholder circular, Philips would initially only offer a 
minority interest of 25% (37.5 million shares) in the IPO followed by more future offers which 
would ultimately lead to a total divestment of the lighting businessxlvi (see Exhibit 15 for Royal 
                                                          
1 The agreement contains a purchase commitment whereby Philips Lighting is entitled of purchasing from Lumileds at least 60% of its actual 
spend in LED components for a period of four years beginning in February 1st, 2016. The price was provided “inter alia” meaning that the 
price had to be equal or below the prices practiced by other relevant suppliers. Under the case where the price is higher than the competitors’, 
there is another separate compensation agreement between Philips Lighting and Royal Philips. 
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Philips’ structure after the IPO). On February 1st, 2016, occurred the “Separation Date” 
between the selling shareholder and the newly named company Philips Lighting Holding B.V., 
the holding company of Philips Lighting. It allocated assets, liabilities, employees and contracts 
of the former Royal Philips between the new Royal Philips and Philips Lighting. With the 
separation, however, a “Relationship Agreement” will be binding the two companiesxlvii (see 
Exhibit 16 & 17 for governance structure and the relationship agreement). 
 “Today’s announcement is an historic one for Philips as we aim to separate our 
company into two market-leading companies focused on capturing opportunities in health 
technology and connected LED lighting solutions markets, respectively. We believe that the 
recent performance of both companies demonstrates that the fundamentals are in place for 
long-term profitable growth and that Philips Lighting is well positioned for success as a stand-
alone company”. 
 Frans van Houten, Royal Philips CEO, Philips Lighting ITF Press Release 
Philips Lighting 
 
Philips Lighting reported in the year end of 2015 an EBITDA of €646 million2 and its EBIT 
amounted to €331 million for the same period (see Exhibit 18 & 19 for Philips Lighting 
historical financial statements). Philips Lighting seemed to be well positioned in the sector as 
the average EBITDA of the industry was €302.91 million3 (see Exhibit 20, 21 & 22 for peers’ 
performance and also Royal Philips’ peers)xlviii. By the time of the IPO, Philips Lighting was 
expected to have a net financial debt of €950 million which would represent approximately 1.5x 
2015 EBITDA4, a multiple way above the sector average of 0.5x EBITDA. The company was 
                                                          
2 The company defines EBITDA as income from operations excluding depreciation, amortization, and impairments of non-financial assets. 
3 The average EBITDA of the industry was calculated through a weighted average (by Market Cap) of the Bloomberg referenced competitors 
EBITDAs. 
4 Philips Lighting realised an EBITDA of €646 million for the year ended 31 December 2015. The ratio assumes approximately €300 million 
of cash on balance sheet post completion of the Offering.   
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targeting an annual dividend pay-out ratio from 40% to 50% of the continuing net income5 
which would be paid out annually in cash starting in 2017xlix.  
Philips Lighting had been investing heavily in R&D to stay at the forefront of technologic 
advances. As so, in 31 December 2015, it registered expenses in R&D of 4.9% of its salesl. 
Consequently, by the end of 2015, the group had 14,000 patents, a number well above its 
competitors. Philips Lighting, in line with Royal Philips’ overall growth strategy, was also 
betting on inorganic growth acquiring other companies. As of the end of 2014, Philips had 
invested €248 million compared to €178 million in 2013. By the end of 2015, cash for investing 
activities amounted to €65 million (see Exhibit 23 for Philips Lighting Cash Flow Statement). 
In the first quarter of 2016, BG Lamps unit accounted for most part of the sales amounting to 
€615 million, a substantial higher sales value compared to BG LED with almost half of the size 
with €355 million in sales (see Exhibit 24). As per geographical cluster, sales in Philips 
Lighting have been shifting moderately (see Exhibit 25 for sales by geographical cluster).  
As most of its sales were from lamps and not LED’s, Philips had a problem to solve and it was 
urgent. The manufacturing plants Philips Lighting had by 2015 were predominately for 
conventional lamps which differed significantly from the ones required for LED lamps. From 
a total of 60 manufacturing plants in 2008, Philips Lighting was able to reduce its 45 
manufacturing plants for traditional lamps to 21 in 2015li. For such to happen, Philips had to 
incur in restructuring costs amounting €261 million in the year end of 2014 and €90 million by 
the end of 2015. This restructure of manufacturing plants would potentially result in additional 
future restructuring costs related to depreciation and impairments, environmental concerns and 
transfer and dismissal of employees. 
                                                          
5 Continuing net income is defined as recurring net income from continuing operations, or net income excluding discontinued operations and 
excluding material non-recurring items. 
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Analysing the opportunity: would it be worth? 
 
After reading the news, de Vries started searching and analysing the lighting market as well as 
Philips Lighting overall performance. Days later, he recalled that Siemens, one of Philips’ main 
competitors, had also divested its lighting business, Osram, back in July 2013. It was time for 
de Vries to gather some info on the past performance of Osram shares. Overall, M&A activity 
in the lighting market was high as industry players wanted to build scale as the market advanced 
towards intelligent lighting solutions (see Exhibit 26 for industry related transactions). 
Osram issued 104.7 million shares (equivalent to 80.5% of the company’s total shares while 
Siemens retained the remaining percentage) at €24.0 eachlii, valuing Osram at €2.5 billion (or 
approximately 7.8x6 EV/EBITDA 2012)liii, a considerably lower value compared to the €3.23 
billion Siemens was initially expecting. This IPO was particularly difficult as Siemens had been 
trying to sell Osram through an IPO since 2011. Due to the lighting market slowdown, the stock 
market was too volatile for Siemens to risk it all, making it calling off the IPO several timesliv. 
De Vries went further and looked in Bloomberg for Osram stock performance after the listing 
date (see Exhibit 27 for Osram stock performance).  
When deepening its research about this possible opportunity in making part and subscribing the 
IPO, Luuk de Vries thought to himself that it would be better to see how the past performances 
were in past Dutch IPOs. What he found was, at least, intriguing. De Vries found that there had 
been an average initial under-pricing level of 17.6% and that the median initial return was 5%, 
while in 17% of the cases the initial returns were negative. Moreover, in the beginning of 1997 
to the 2000’s, the level of under-pricing by the end of the first trading day was 35.8% where 
the IPOs significantly underperformed their sector-specific benchmark by 38.4% after 3 yearslv.  
                                                          
6 To reach an EV/EBITDA multiple of 7.8x, it was added to the market capitalization of €2.5 billion, Osram Lighting 2012 Net Debt of 
€595.3 million to reach an EV of €3.0953 billion. Subsequently, it was divided by its 2012 EBITDA of €395.4 million. 
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As the IPO date was approaching the market was reacting in the meantime. Contrary to the 
beliefs of the CEO, Mr. van Houten, analysts at Jefferieslvi, an investment bank headquartered 
in New York, believed that Philips Lighting would have a difficult future as a stand-alone 
company due to the fact that 85% of its profits were coming from the sale of traditional bulbs, 
a market that was shrinking with the rise of LED lamps sales. Moreover, Barclays analystslvii 
were fearing the slow pace of the lighting divestment, considering it would take longer for 
Philips to improve its remaining businesses which accounted for two thirds of the Dutch 
conglomerate’s revenues. During the period after the announcement of the demerger of the two 
companies, Daniel Cunliffe, analyst at Liberum Capital, stated “what I’ve heard is [an 
enterprise] valuation of up to €5.5 billion [for Philips’ lighting business]”lviii.  
On May 16th, Royal Philips announced in a press release that Philips Lighting shares would be 
offered at a price range between €18.50 and €22.50lix. That range was valuing the business at a 
market capitalization between €2.78 and €3.38 billion. According to the new company’s CEO: 
 “The interest we have received from the investor community in Philips Lighting is very 
encouraging. As a standalone, listed company we will be committed to further expanding our 
global market-leading position in the general lighting market, driving the transition to LED 
and connect lighting systems and services, and delivering on our financial outlook. With a 
strong cash flow generation, we believe we present a solid investment case”. 
Eric Rondolat, Philips Lighting CEO, IPO Launch Press Release  
Moreover, the company granted the underwriters, as part of the offering, an over-allotment 
option for up an additional 15% of the number of offered shares (“Over-Allotment shares”). In 
sum, would the option be converted and the total amount of shares offered would account for 
28.75% of the total shares. Both companies, after the split, would be subjected to a lock-up 
period of 180 days and Philips’ Board of Management (CEO and CFO of both companies) 
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would be subject to a lock-up of 360 days. The lock-up period makes it impossible, without 
permission from the Joint Global Coordinators, to sell, directly or indirectly, ordinary shares 
within the period settled. The intentions of Royal Philips consisted in selling the shares to 
institutional and retail investors in the Netherlands and to other certain qualified institutional 
investors in other countrieslx.  
The Decision 
 
It was May 16th and de Vries had to hurry up to decide what to do with all that information he 
had gathered for the past month as the offering period had started at that day, 9 a.m., and would 
cease for institutional investors by May 26th, 12 a.m.. De Vries had to be quick especially 
because he had still to convince Vincent Shuuring to participate in the IPO would he decide 
that it was a good opportunity. More than convincing Shuuring to buy at the IPO, de Vries had 
also to decide which strategy would better suit this IPO. After all this search during the past 
month, should de Vries try to convince Vincent Shuuring to buy at the IPO? At which price? If 
yes, should he recommend to flip the stock (buy at the IPO and sell immediately in the first day 
of trading) playing with the possible IPO discount? Or would it be more beneficial in this case 
to hold longer the stocks as data pointed to good returns for spun-off companies? However, de 
Vries knew that this was not a spin-off as the media frequently referred to. Hence, if he decides 
not to recommend to buy at the IPO, should they short sell the stock as future prospects for 





















The following case study has the objective of studying the situation involving Royal Philips, 
Philips Lighting and the fictitious Portfolio Manager of AMS Capital Hedge Fund, Luuk de 
Vries, as of May 2016. The case will focus on Demerger, Initial Public Offering (IPO), Equity 
Carve-Out and Investment Strategy Decisions subjects, making this case appropriate to study 
in courses such as Applied Corporate Finance and Mergers & Acquisitions.  When solving this 
case, students should understand the concept of IPO, the strategic reasoning behind selling 
Philips Lighting and the investment opportunities this sale has for profit seeking investors. A 
set of proposed questions follows, together with the suggested answers.  
1 – Why is Royal Philips selling its lighting business? Why are they selling equity instead 
of raising debt in the capital markets? Relate it with Royal Philips Operating 
Performance ability to sustain Value Creation. 
Part 1 – Why are they selling? 
Philips’ culture relied on divesting and selling businesses that struggled to succeed in the 
market. Its failure in introducing the CD-Interactive led Philips to understand that a shift in its 
strategy was necessary. Therefore, in the 90’s Philips reshaped its operations and began 
focusing on the healthcare industry. This industry presented itself to be very attractive and with 
potential to grow a lot. By looking at Exhibit 14, it is possible to see how fast the market grew. 
On top of that, as stated in the case, this industry had trends that forecasted long term growth 
and it was an industry that was still in need for more innovation (contrary to the lighting market 
that, by looking at Exhibit 12, shows to be a market with few opportunities). Royal Philips had 
already assumed itself as a healthcare company which is noticeable in their 2008 financial 
report: “Philips continued its journey to become a health and well-being company”. Looking at 
Exhibit 7, it is visible the more prominent importance of the Healthcare sector for Royal Philips 
overall performance. Healthcare was contributing with 45% of the total EBITA of the three 
businesses combined whereas the Lighting sector was just accounting for 26%.  
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Finally, as observed in Exhibit 2, Royal Philips was underperforming the market in the later 
years. Hence there was pressure to do something and reshape the management team and focus. 
Two key metrics that provide extremely important information on company’s value creation 
are the ROIC (Return on Invested Capital) and the WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital). 
If WACC is greater than ROIC, then the company is destroying value.  
To infer if Royal Philips was indeed destroying value, first it is going to be calculated its WACC 
followed by its ROIC. Based on Exhibit 8, one can retrieve the main metrics to calculate the 
WACC. As shown in TN Exhibit 1, first, one needs to calculate Royal Philips’ cost of equity 
using CAPM model giving a cost of 9.80%. For the cost of debt, it was used Royal Philips’ 
credit rating for senior debt of BBB+. The spread was then retrieved from the table in Exhibit 
8 (correspondent to the credit rating) and added to the risk free rate. The market value of equity 
was reached by multiplying its share price by the total number of outstanding shares giving a 
value of about €21.606 billion. Finally, to reach the market value of debt, it was assumed the 
book value of debt (interest bearing) and treated as a one coupon bond with a coupon set equal 
to the interest expenses on all debt and the maturity set equal to the face value weighted average 
maturity of debt. The coupon was discounted at the cost of debt of the company. With all the 
calculations shown on TN Exhibit 1, a market value of debt of about €6.830 billion is reached. 
Assuming corporate taxes of 38.40%, and using the WACC formula, Royal Philips has a 
WACC of 7.87%. Additionally, an alternative WACC formula was used to strengthen the 
analysis.  As for the ROIC, the formula used was (Op.Income*(1-t))/(NWCR+Fixed Assets). 
For the Operating Income, an average of the last three years was used to account for the 
substantial volatility presented. Based on TN Exhibit 1 calculations, Royal Philips has a ROIC 
of 3.03%. Therefore, one can see that Royal Philips was indeed destroying value. In situations 
like this, the management team is put under pressure to improve the ROIC which is commonly 
done by selling non-performing assets in order to get the ROIC in line with WACC (TN Exhibit 
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1 also shows comparison between value creation of Healthtech business versus the Lighting 
one). 
Another reason that could be behind this strategic sale is the possible conglomerate discount 
being applied to Royal Philips’ stock. Khorana et al (2011)lxi debate on this recent trend where 
companies go under corporate restructurings to increase corporate values. More on this will be 
analysed in Question 3.  
Part 2 - Why selling equity instead of raising debt? 
According to Ali, Hashmi and Mehmoodlxii (2016) findings, there is an inverted u-shaped 
relation between diversification strategy and performance where too much diversification 
creates agency problems and internal inefficiencies. Royal Philips was more in need of 
narrowing its scopelxiii than asking for debt in the market as previously founded with ROIC and 
WACC comparison. In addition to that, according to a McKinsey&Companylxiv article that 
debates about Equity Carve-Outs, they enable full strategic freedomlxv and access to 
independent fundinglxvi. According to Frans van Houten, this was their intention:” At the same 
time, giving independence to our Lighting solutions business will better enable it to expand its 
global leadership position and venture into adjacent market opportunities”. This would 
potentiate Philips Lighting future transactions. However, despite carving-out the lighting 
business, Royal Philips would still hold 75% of the shares. Royal Philips interests were in fact 
still dependent on Philips Lighting performance. Consequently, for a carved-out company, it 
can use stock option compensations to improve the company’s performance as they are the 
significant part of the total compensation to carve-out executives. This would work as a sort of 
mechanism to align interests.  
To conclude, in this case, the sale of Philips Lighting works in three ways: enables Royal Philips 
to focus in HealThech (gradually, since they would still hold 75% of lighting and probably this 
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focus would not be so visible in the beginning), secondly, uses the proceeds of the sale to 
finance investment in its HealthTech business and third it can possibly improve Royal Philips 
future valuations. Following this reasoning, selling equity makes more sense than simply 
issuing bonds (debt financing) to boost their HealthTech business. 
2 – What is the relation between Royal Philips and Philips Lighting after the IPO? Is 
there any specificity regarding Corporate Governance? 
After the IPO, Royal Philips would hold 75% of Philips Lighting. The ownership structure can 
be seen in Exhibit 15. Despite being two distinctive companies after the “Separation Date”, 
both entities would launch their products under the same brand: “Philips”, as it would be 
advantageous for both companies since “Philips” was a strong brand in the market, and more 
important, it was considered the most preferred one in LED lighting globally. This would 
potentiate Philips Lighting initial performance as a stand-alone company. Furthermore, assets, 
liabilities, employees and contracts of the former Royal Philips were allocated between the new 
Royal Philips and Philips Lighting.  
By operating in the LED business, Philips Lighting had to maintain a relationship with the 
Lumileds and automotive lighting components businesses, which were not included under 
Philips Lighting operations, (remained under 100% ownership of Royal Philips) but worked as 
its supplier. The strategic partnership and supply agreement contains a purchase commitment 
whereby Philips Lighting is entitled of purchasing from Lumileds at least 60% of its actual 
spend in LED components for a period of four years beginning in February 1st, 2016. The price 
was provided “inter alia” meaning that the price had to be equal or below the prices practiced 
by other relevant suppliers. Under the case where the price is higher than the competitors’, there 
is another separate compensation agreement between Philips Lighting and Royal Philips.  
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Finally, in terms of governance, Philips Lighting will have its own structure as it can be seen in 
Exhibit 16. It is a two-tier board structure consisting in a Board of Management and a 
Supervisory Board. The board of management is independent of Royal Philips. However, 
several members of the supervisory board were also executives at Royal Philips. Kees van Lede 
was since 2003 member of the supervisory board of Royal Philips, Frans van Houten, at that 
time was CEO and Chairman of Royal Philips and Abhijit Bhattacharya was CFO and executive 
vice president of Royal Philips. This aspect comes from the Relationship Agreement whereby 
Royal Philips, holding more than 30% of Philips Lighting, had the right to nominate two 
members to the Supervisory Board. This aspect of governance relationship between parent and 
carved-out company is debated by Koller (1990)lxvii. When the parent still holds a controlling 
stake in the newly carved-out company, the parent’s executives make sure that the best interests 
of the company and shareholders are met. This agreement certifies Royal Philips that Philips 
Lighting takes the right decisions for a strong future performance as they still own 75% (or 
71.25% with the over-allotment option) of Philips Lighting shares and want to assure they do 
not incur in losses. 
3 – What is a conglomerate discount? In this case, do you consider Royal Philips is 
suffering from it? 
Part 1 – What is a conglomerate discount? 
Years ago, companies started acquiring different businesses saying it would allow them to 
create positive synergies: through cost reduction, risk diversification and revenue upside by 
selling complementary products. Along with this phenomenon, another one, related to 
conglomerates’ valuation appeared: the conglomerate discount. The conglomerate discount is 
nothing more than the conglomerate’s stock price being undervalued relative to its pure-play 
competitors. A way to calculate it is by summing up the intrinsic value of each subsidiary and 
subtracting the enterprise value of the conglomerate. According to Ingo Walter (2004)lxviii, there 
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seems to exist two main reasons for such to happen. First, it is argued that management allocates 
capital inefficiently and foregoes positive NPV projects by not being able to focus on each 
business. Secondly, investors usually lack to “have a view” on the pureness of one of each 
leading them to avoid these types of stocks. 
Part 2 – Does Royal Philips suffer from conglomerate discount? 
To evaluate if there is in fact a discount being applied to Royal Philips, it needs to be analysed 
if the sum of the parts (Royal Philips in Healthtech and Philips Lighting) is worth more than 
the prior conglomerate of Royal Philips. For this measurement, a modified variation of Berger 
and Ofek (1995)lxix is going to be used. This version, compares the EV’s of the parts to avoid 
possible cash distortions (especially in European conglomerates) that could arise from market 
capitalizations (Bernhard and Carsten (2003))lxx. For such, the valuation approach used is going 
to be the multiples valuation. The reasons to forego the Discounted Cash Flow Method are the 
uncertain, difficult to estimate and high growth rates for the Healthtech industry. Hence, using 
the DCF method could induce weak and misleading valuations. To calculate the EV of each 
company, it is going to be used the EV/EBITDA as well as the EV/EBIT multiple. According 
to a research conducted by McKinsey&Companylxxi, P/E multiples do not account for capital 
structure and are based on earnings which include many non-operating items. Regarding the 
EV/Sales multiple, it is only useful when companies are recent and with relevant revenues 
growth, which is not this case. Hence, the EV/EBITDA poses to be the most appropriate one as 
it corrects for the up mentioned problems. The use of EV/EBIT is to account for depreciation 
and amortization allocation since healthcare and lighting pose to be capital intensive sectors 
and will have high amounts of D&A. To choose comparable peers for each company, several 
steps will be taken: analyse which ones have the same core businesses, infer which ones have 
comparable and similar relevant sizes and also which ones have the same growth prospects. 
Presented also in the case, Exhibits 13 & 26 show similar transactions of companies from the 
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sector of heathtech (medical devices) and lighting (despite lower deal sizes, those are the best 
proxies as, according to IMAP research in 2016, the average deal value was $38 million). 
Alongside the trade multiples of comparable companies, one may also use transaction multiples 
to strengthen the valuation. 
Taking into consideration the up mentioned criteria, for Philips Lighting (with revenue growth 
of approximately 6.93%), Acuity Brands Inc, Zumtobel Group AB and Osram Light (despite 
the negative growth, it is the biggest Philips Lighting’s competitor) will be used as comparable 
firms for valuation. Based on TN Exhibit 2 a football field is built to find a range where Philips 
Lighting EV can be. Shown in TN Exhibit 3, one can analyse the football field drawn. Solely 
based on such information, it is possible to range Philips Lighting EV between €3.33 billion 
and €7.77 billion. For this analysis, the Osram IPO was also included in the transaction 
multiples. The EV ranges were based on Philips Lighting EBITDA of €646 million and EBIT 
of €331 million. 
For Philips Healthtech (which registered a revenues growth of approximately 16.4%), assuming 
the same criteria, GN Store Nord, Draegerwerk AG&Co and Carl Zeiss Meditec AG will be 
used as comparable firms for valuation. Based on TN Exhibit 4 and TN Exhibit 5, following 
the same logic and method used in Philips Lighting valuation, Philips Healthtech value would 
range between €17.57 billion and €39.32 billion. This valuation assumed €2.492 billion of 
EBITDA (subtract €646 million of lighting to the total Royal Philips’ 2015 EBITDA of €3.139 
billion) and an EBIT of €535 million. Therefore, the sum of the parts gives an EV ranging 
between €20.90 billion and €47.09 billion. When comparing to the reported EV of Royal Philips 
of €25.707 billion it is possible to infer that there is a big likelihood of Royal Philips being 
valued at discount (see TN Exhibit 6 for graphical analysis).  




To infer how much Philips Lighting is worth, it is required to reach its market capitalization 
back from the EV which was already obtained in Question 3.The bridge to equity one needs to 
develop to reach market capitalization from EV is to add financial investments and cash (cash 
and cash equivalents) and then to subtract debt (including LT Liabilities), leases, preference 
shares and minority and non-controlling interests. In other words, it is finding the net debt and 
subtracting it from the EV. Based on Exhibit 19, Philips Lighting reached a net debt value of 
approximately €743 million. Therefore, subtracting net debt to EV gives Philips Lighting a 
market capitalization between €2.59 billion and €7.03 billion. It is left to calculate the total 
number of shares. In the case it is highlighted that Royal Philips will sell in the IPO 25% of the 
shares which corresponds to 37.5 million shares. Mathematically, one can calculate that 100% 
of the shares corresponds to 150 million shares. This returns a price per share range between 
€17.26 and €46.87.  
5 – Should de Vries convince Shuuring to buy at the IPO? If so, should they hold longer 
the stock or sell immediately in the first day of trading? If they opt not to buy at the 
IPO, should they short sell the stock? 
Buy at the IPO and hold the stock: 
There are some facts that turn this investment as a favourable one and others that not. Given 
the range between €18.50 and €22.50 per share Royal Philips was predicting to offer the stock, 
Philips Lighting was being valued at a market value between €2.78 and €3.38 billion. 
Mentioned in the case, Daniel Cunliffe, analyst at Liberum Capital, stated that what was being 
debated in the market was an EV up to €5.5 billion. According to Questions 3 & 4 calculations, 
Philips Lighting share price range was pointing for an IPO under-pricing. Mentioned in the 
case, in past Dutch IPOs in the 2000’s, the under-priced IPOs tended to underperform the 
market by 38.4% after 3 years. But there are also facts that turn this investment strategy 
desirable. Osram IPO, as it can be seen in Exhibit 27, was a success in the long term. It beat 
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the market with a cumulative return of approximately 80% whereas the MSCI Index gave 
approximately a cumulative return of 25%. However, if seen closely, there is a sharp decrease 
recently in Osram share price. This is due to the fact that analysts gave a considerably worse 
2016 outlook than they expectedlxxii. A last plus in holding longer the shares is tied with the fact 
that Philips brand was the preferred one in LEDs giving it a strong positioning in the market. 
All in all, and based on Exhibit 9, it is possible to see how good returns are for spun-off 
companies. Remains to be said that despite all the media referring to this transaction as a spin-
off, in reality, it was not. 
Buy at the IPO and sell in the first day of trading: 
According to market analysts and with the share price valuation obtained in Question 4, Philips 
Lighting stock had chances of going up in the first day of trading. This argument gains even 
more credibility when backed up by Oliver Reiche (2015)lxxiii, who states in his book that every 
country in Europe is affected by IPO under-pricing. Assuming the stock was offered at the 
highest predicted price of €22.50, AMS Capital could make a strong profit. Also, such 
competitive and fierce outlook for this market near future posed several risks that a profit 
seeking hedge fund may not be willing to incur in. The major downside in incurring in this 
strategy was the return they would possibly forego in the long-term, especially if the stock 
behaved like Osram. Being Philips Lighting the bigger player in the lighting industry, as 
mentioned in the case, it could perfectly do well if focus solely on its business after the 
separation. 
Do not buy at the IPO and going short in the first day of trading: 
The future for Philips Lighting as a stand-alone company was challenging. Most of its sales, 
€615 million, were coming from BG Lamps and with recent EU regulations, traditional lamps 
were being banned and shifted to LEDs. One can observe Exhibit 12 and see that despite a 
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forecasted growth for the lighting market, only LEDs were driving that growth. As mentioned 
in the case, Philips Lighting was already in the process of changing its traditional lamp plants 
to LED plants but such could lead to more future costs and it was a process that could take long 
to be finished. Another concern was that, being the main geographical drivers of this market 
China and Latin America, based on Exhibit 25, Philips Lighting sales were still more 
predominant in Northern America and Western Europe. Topping that, Lumileds was not being 
included in the sale of Lighting and there were rumours in the market that this IPO was 
happening after Royal Philips failing to find a potential buyerlxxiv. As a final regard for this 
matter, such dividend pay-out ratio Philips Lighting was targeting would decrease the share 
price, and profit margins could decrease as this market was experiencing a price erosion due to 
fierce competition from Asia. These facts could induce a share price drop in the first months of 
trading. On the other hand, being Philips Lighting the major player in this market, there was a 
big risk in expecting that its price would go down. 
Final recommendation: 
The best recommendation should be underpinned by these major facts: AMS Capital was not 
performing well and more negative returns could seriously damage it; based on their investment 
strategy, they looked for short to medium term profits; the future outlook for Philips Lighting 
was challenging and uncertain. With that in mind, Luuk de Vries should try to convince Robert 
Shuuring to buy at the IPO and flip the stock in the first day of trading. According to Ritter and 
Welch (2002)lxxv , underwriters do promote specific share allocation for flippers to quick profit. 
Finally, according to Beatty and Ritter (1986)lxxvi, ex-ante uncertainty leads to IPO under-price. 
Since there was uncertainty regarding the lighting market and Philips Lighting future, chances 





















































































































































































In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending 2013 2014 2015
Revenue 21,990 21,391 24,244
    + Sales & Services Revenue 21,990 21,391 24,244
  - Cost of Revenue 12,653 13,185 14,388
    + Cost of Goods & Services 12,653 13,185 14,388
Gross Profit 9,337 8,206 9,856
  + Other Operating Income 122 63 137
  - Operating Expenses 7,604 7,783 9,001
    + Selling, General & Admin 5,882 5,871 7,024
    + Selling & Marketing 5,057 5,124 5,815
    + General & Administrative 825 747 1,209
    + Research & Development 1,659 1,635 1,927
    + Other Operating Expense 63 277 50
Operating Income (Loss) 1,855 486 992
  - Non-Operating (Income) Loss 330 301 369
Pretax Income 1,525 185 623
  - Income Tax Expense (Benefit) 466 26 239
  - (Income) Loss from Affiliates 25 -62 -30
Income (Loss) from Cont Ops 1,034 221 414
  - Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) -138 -190 -245
Income (Loss) Incl. MI 1,172 411 659
  - Minority Interest 3 -4 14
Net Income, GAAP 1,169 415 645
  - Preferred Dividends 0 0 0
  - Other Adjustments 0 0 0










In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending 2013 2014 2015
Total Assets
  + Cash, Cash Equivalents & STI 2,475 1,998 1,778
  + Accounts & Notes Receiv 4,420 4,476 4,727
  + Inventories 3,240 3,314 3,463
  + Other ST Assets 1,339 2,603 2,725
Total Current Assets 11,474 12,391 12,693
  + Property, Plant & Equip, Net 2,780 2,095 2,322
  + LT Investments & Receivables 496 462 489
  + Other LT Assets 11,809 13,404 15,472
Total Noncurrent Assets 15,085 15,961 18,283
Total Assets 26,559 28,352 30,976
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
  + Payables & Accruals 5,435 4,600 4,897
    + Accounts Payable 2,458 2,495 2,669
  + ST Debt 592 392 1,665
  + Other ST Liabilities 2,449 3,684 3,506
Total Current Liabilities 8,476 8,676 10,068
  + LT Debt 3,309 3,712 4,095
  + Other LT Liabilities 3,547 4,996 5,033
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 6,856 8,708 9,128
Total Liabilities 15,332 17,384 19,196
  + Preferred Equity and Hybrid Capital 0 0 0
  + Share Capital & APIC 1,984 2,368 2,855
  - Treasury Stock 718 547 363
  + Retained Earnings 10,438 8,790 8,040
  + Other Equity -490 256 1,130
Equity Before Minority Interest 11,214 10,867 11,662
  + Minority/Non Controlling Interest 13 101 118
Total Equity 11,227 10,968 11,780











                                                          
7 This Income Statement is a proxy obtained by subtracting Philips Lighting Income Statement as a stand-alone company to 
Royal Philips Consolidated Income Statement 
In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending 2013 2014 2015
Revenue 14,861 14,410 16,779
    + Sales & Services Revenue 14,861 14,410 16,779
  - Cost of Revenue 8,117 8,780 9,654
    + Cost of Goods & Services 8,117 8,780 9,654
Gross Profit 6,744 5,630 7,125
  + Other Operating Income 91 50 89
  - Operating Expenses 5,348 5,653 6,679
    + Selling, General & Admin 3,927 3,991 5,040
    + Selling & Marketing 3,335 3,467 4,064
    + General & Administrative 592 524 976
    + Research & Development 1,284 1,240 1,561
    + Other Operating Expense 137 422 78
Operating Income (Loss) 1,487 27 535
  - Non-Operating (Income) Loss 329 295 365
Pretax Income 1,158 -268 170
  - Income Tax Expense (Benefit) 421 -40 156
  - (Income) Loss from Affiliates 26 -60 -30
Income (Loss) from Cont Ops 866 250 174
  - Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) -138 -190 -245
Income (Loss) Incl. MI 1,004 440 419
  - Minority Interest 3 3 0
Net Income, GAAP 1,001 437 419
  - Preferred Dividends 0 0 0
  - Other Adjustments 0 0 0




Exhibit 6 - Royal Philips Pro-Forma Balance Sheet (without Philips Lighting) (2013-2015)8 
 
 
                                                          
8 This Balance Sheet is a proxy obtained by subtracting Philips Lighting Balance Sheet as a stand-alone company to Royal 
Philips Consolidated Balance Sheet 
In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending 2013 2014 2015
Total Assets
  + Cash, Cash Equivalents & STI 2,426 1,923 1,695
  + Accounts & Notes Receiv 3,118 3,018 3,208
  + Inventories 2,257 2,318 2,475
  + Other ST Assets 1,176 2,406 2,531
Total Current Assets 8,977 9,665 9,909
  + Property, Plant & Equip, Net 1,950 1,373 1,688
  + LT Investments & Receivables 466 429 461
  + Other LT Assets 9,336 10,553 12,475
Total Noncurrent Assets 11,752 12,355 14,624
Total Assets 20,729 22,020 24,533
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
  + Payables & Accruals 3,842 3,045 3,189
    + Accounts Payable 1,571 1,611 1,618
  + ST Debt 590 343 1,579
  + Other ST Liabilities 2,144 3,349 3,110
Total Current Liabilities 6,576 6,737 7,878
  + LT Debt 3,303 3,671 4,093
  + Other LT Liabilities 2,922 4,227 4,398
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 6,225 7,898 8,491
Total Liabilities 12,801 14,635 16,369
  + Preferred Equity and Hybrid Capital 0 0 0
  + Share Capital & APIC 1,984 2,368 2,855
  - Treasury Stock 718 547 363
  + Retained Earnings 10,270 8,812 7,814
  + Other Equity -3,619 -3,261 -2,157
Equity Before Minority Interest 7,917 7,372 8,149
  + Minority/Non Controlling Interest 11 13 15
Total Equity 7,928 7,385 8,164




Exhibit 7 – Royal Philips per operational segment (2014-2015)  
 











Exhibit 8 – 2015 Philips Group Equity and Debt market conditions 
 
 









MKT Risk Premium 5.90%
S&P Rating (senior debt) BBB+
Corporate Taxes 38.40%
Interest Expense million € 271
Unsecured USD Bonds (million EUR)
Coupon YTM Amount Maturity (years)
Due 2025 7.75% 7.43% 91 10
Due 2026 7.20% 6.89% 152 11
Due 2025 7.13% 6.79% 94 10
Due 2018 5.75% 6.07% 1,144 3
Due 2038 6.88% 7.21% 915 23
Due 2022 3.75% 3.91% 915 7
Due 2042 5.00% 5.27% 458 27
Source: Reuters; Royal Philips 2015 Annual Report; Bloomberg
Philips Lighting
Debt 1 2 4 7
(in €millions) Total < 1 year 1-3 years 3-5 years > 5 years
Long Term Debt 47 45 0 0 2
Interest Expense million € 5
Corporate Taxes 38.40%
S&P Rating (senior debt) BBB+








Exhibit 9 – Total Spin-off return by Market Capitalization 
 
 
For large manufacturing firms
If interest coverage ratio is
> ≤ to Rating is Spread is
-100000 0.199999 D2/D 14.00%
0.20 0.649999 C2/C 10.50%
0.65 0.799999 Ca2/CC 8.00%
0.80 1.249999 Caa/CCC 6.50%
1.25 1.499999 B3/B- 5.50%
1.50 1.749999 B2/B 4.50%
1.75 1.999999 B1/B+ 3.75%
2.00 2.2499999 Ba2/BB 3.00%
2.25 2.49999 Ba1/BB+ 2.50%
2.50 2.999999 Baa2/BBB 1.60%
3.00 4.249999 A3/A- 1.25%
4.25 5.499999 A2/A 1.10%
5.50 6.499999 A1/A+ 1.00%
6.50 8.499999 Aa2/AA 0.80%










Exhibit 10 – Lighting bulbs specifications by type 
 
 
Source: Johnson, Holly. (2017). “Light Bulb Showdown: LED vs. CFL vs. Incandescent”. The 




Exhibit 11 – World GDP and Global Lamp Market (2005-2011) 
  
 








Source: The Boston Consulting Group. (2015). How to win in a transformig lighting industry 
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Exhibit 13 – Medical Devices M&A deals  
 
 





Exhibit 14 – Health and Wellness Market Size (2002-2016) 
 
 
Source: Passport Euromonitor, Health and Wellness: Euromonitor from trade sources/national 
statistics 
(in EUR millions)
Date Target Target Description Buyer Size EV/EBITDA
Jul-05 Symmetry Medical Inc. Surgical implants and instruments manufacturer Tecomet Inc. € 497.70 11.83
2012 Synthes Inc. Surgical instruments, implants and biomaterials developer Johnson & Johnson € 13,806.20 10.1




Detection, diagnosis, evaluation, monitoring, and treatment 
testing services


























Exhibit 15 – Royal Philips’ Structure 
 
Before the IPO 
 
 



















Source: Philips Lighting IPO Prospectus  







Source: Philips Lighting IPO Prospectus 
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In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending 2013 2014 2015
Revenue 7,129 6,981 7,465
    + Sales & Services Revenue 7,129 6,981 7,465
  - Cost of Revenue 4,573 4,671 4,810
    + Cost of Goods & Services 4,573 4,671 4,810
Gross Profit 2,556 2,310 2,655
  + Other Operating Income 31 13 48
  - Operating Expenses 2,374 2,282 2,372
    + Selling, General & Admin 1,955 1,880 1,984
    + Selling & Marketing 1,722 1,657 1,751
    + General & Administrative 233 223 233
    + Research & Development 375 395 366
    + Prov For Doubtful Accts — — —
    + Other Operating Expense 44 7 22
Operating Income (Loss) 213 41 331
  - Non-Operating (Income) Loss 1 6 8
Pretax Income 212 35 323
  - Income Tax Expense (Benefit) 45 66 83
  - (Income) Loss from Affiliates -1 -2 0
Income (Loss) from Cont Ops 168 -29 240
  - Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0 0 0
Income (Loss) Incl. MI 168 -29 240
  - Minority Interest 0 -7 14
Net Income, GAAP 168 -22 226
  - Preferred Dividends 0 0 0
  - Other Adjustments 0 0 0




Exhibit 19 – “Carved-Out” Balance Sheet Philips Lighting (2013-2015) 
9 
 
                                                          
9 Other LT Liabilities include pension liabilities, accrued liabilities, deferred revenues, deferred tax liabilities, 
derivatives & hedging and miscellaneous liabilities  
In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending 2013 2014 2015
Total Assets
  + Cash, Cash Equivalents & STI 49 75 83
  + Accounts & Notes Receiv 1,302 1,458 1,519
  + Inventories 983 996 988
  + Other ST Assets 163 197 194
Total Current Assets 2,497 2,726 2,784
  + Property, Plant & Equip, Net 830 722 634
  + LT Investments & Receivables 30 33 28
  + Other LT Assets 2,473 2,851 2,997
Total Noncurrent Assets 3,333 3,606 3,659
Total Assets 5,830 6,332 6,443
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
  + Payables & Accruals 1,593 1,555 1,708
  + ST Debt 2 49 86
  + Other ST Liabilities 305 335 396
Total Current Liabilities 1,900 1,939 2,190
  + LT Debt 6 41 2
  + Other LT Liabilities 625 769 635
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 631 810 637
Total Liabilities 2,531 2,749 2,827
  + Preferred Equity and Hybrid Capital 0 0 0
  + Share Capital & APIC 0 0 0
  - Treasury Stock 0 0 0
  + Retained Earnings 168 -22 226
  + Other Equity 3,129 3,517 3,287
Equity Before Minority Interest 3,297 3,495 3,513
  + Minority/Non Controlling Interest 2 88 103
Total Equity 3,299 3,583 3,616




Exhibit 20 – Philips Lighting Peers Overview 
 
Acuity Brands Inc: North American market leader and one of the world’s leading providers of lighting and building 
management solutions for commercial, institutional, industrial, infrastructure, and residential applications 
throughout North America and select international markets. 
Faegerhult AB: develops, produces and market professional lighting solutions for public environments such as 
offices, schools, retail areas, industries and hospitals, indoor and outdoor. 
Zhejiang Yankon Group Co: Specializes in LED-based commercial lighting, home lighting, office lighting, and 
outdoor lighting as one of the largest high-tech businesses in China’s green lighting industry. 
Ocean’s King Lighting Scie&Tech Co: China-based company principally engaged in the research, development, 
manufacture and distribution of specialty environment lightening equipment. The Company’s products consist of 
fixed lightening devices, mobile lightening devices and portable lightening devices. 
Zumtobel Group AB: International lighting group and a leading player in the field of innovative lighting solutions 
and components. In the lighting business the Group with its Thorn, Zumtobel and acdc brands is the European 
market leader. 
Thorpe: Specialise in designing and manufacturing professional lighting equipment. Their products are sold 
throughout the world. 
Dalian Insulator Group: It is a publicly listed “High Tech” company engaged in the research, production and sales 
of electrical porcelain and composite insulators, station post insulators and porcelain hardware fittings. It is the 
largest transmission line insulator manufacturing enterprise in China. 
Osram Light AG: Osram Licht AG manufactures lights. The Company produces lamps, light-emitting diodes 
(LEDs), light engines, lighting management systems, specialty lighting, indoor and outdoor LED luminaires, 
dimmers, and other related lighting products. 
Source: Bloomberg 
Data from 31/12/2015
(in million euros except share price) EBITDA Market Cap EV Price Debt
Acuity Brands Inc 364 9,389 9,017 215 315
Fagerhult AB 54 661 755 6 146
Zhejiang Yankon Group  Co 57 1,811 1,671 1 67
Ocean's King Lighting Scie&Tech Co 7 1,587 1,472 3 1
Zumtobel Group AB 91 1,013 1,152 23 216
Thorpe 27 389 339 3 0
Dalian Insulator Group 12 521 551 1 40
Osram Licht AG 543 4,061 3,400 39 112
Revenue Beta Tax
(in million euros except share price) EBIT Earnings Revenues Growth Levered Rate
Acuity Brands Inc 325 192 2,337 32.8% 1.44 35%
Fagerhult AB 42 31 418 1.7% 0.99 22%
Zhejiang Yankon Group  Co 45 53 607 53.5% 0.48 25%
Ocean's King Lighting Scie&Tech Co 5 10 127 -0.4% 25%
Zumtobel Group AB 24 11 1,357 3.3% 1.30 25%
Thorpe 22 17 119 23.1% 0.30 20%
Dalian Insulator Group 6 5 86 20.5% 0.56 25%
Osram Licht AG 338 166 3,572 -30.5% 0.90 15%




Exhibit 21 – Royal Philips (after IPO) Peers Overview 
 
 
Lifco AB-B SHS: Lifco’s business idea is to acquire and develop market leading, niched companies. Our aim is 
to secure that the subsidiaries continuously improve earnings and deliver strong cash flows.  
GN Store Nord: The GN Group is a global leader in intelligent audio solutions that let you hear more, do more 
and be more than you ever thought possible. Our unique portfolio of medical, professional & consumer audio 
solutions – and the deep research & development expertise behind this range of products gives our brands 
unprecedented advantages in the med-tech, hearables and intelligent audio field. 
Draegerwerk AG & Co: Draegerwerk AG & Company KGAA manufactures medical, safety, and aerospace 
equipment. The Company produces ventilators, monitoring equipment, transport incubators, anesthesia machines, 
surgical lights, ward equipment, home care equipment, systems for safe breathing in industry, mining and 
firefighting, and airplane crew and passenger oxygen systems. 
Guerbet: Guerbet's men and women are committed to offering health professionals contrast agents, medical 
devices and innovative solutions indispensable to diagnostic and interventional imaging to improve patients' 
prognosis and quality of life. 
Elekta AB: Elekta is proud to be the leading innovator of equipment and software used to improve, prolong and 
save the lives of people with cancer and brain disorders. Our treatment solutions and oncology informatics 
portfolios are designed to enhance the delivery of radiation therapy, radiosurgery and brachytherapy, and to drive 
cost efficiency in clinical workflows. 
Data from 31/12/2015
(in million euros except share price) EBITDA Market Cap EV Price Debt
Lifco AB-B SHS 135 2,095 2,309 23 262
GN Store Nord 234 2,724 3,020 17 314
Draegerwerk AG & Co 158 1,134 1,271 69 354
Guerbet 87 794 1,082 65 342
Elekta AB 131 3,003 3,294 8 538
Carl Zeiss Meditec AG 150 2,321 2,363 29 13
Comet Holding AG 33 518 516 67 20
Osram Light AG 543 4,061 3,400 39 112
Alimak Group AB 43 403 407 9 89
Alfa Laval AB 798 7,073 8,368 17 1,597
Revenue Beta Tax
(in million euros except share price) EBIT Earnings Revenues Growth Levered Rate
Lifco AB-B SHS 118 87 844 12.9% 22%
GN Store Nord 154 108 1,040 5.6% 0.80 24%
Draegerwerk AG & Co 73 25 2,609 7.2% 0.77 15%
Guerbet 58 39 489 19.5% 0.50 33%
Elekta AB 63 15 1,203 2.7% 0.96 22%
Carl Zeiss Meditec AG 131 62 1,040 14.4% 0.41 15%
Comet Holding AG 24 16 264 11.5% 1.27 9%
Osram Light AG 338 166 3,572 -30.5% 0.90 15%
Alimak Group AB 37 14 218 13.6% 22%
Alfa Laval AB 610 410 4,248 10.2% 1.12 22%
Source: Bloomberg, Reuters, Deloitte
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Carl Zeiss Meditec AG: Our aim is to contribute to progress in medical technology and help healthcare 
professionals improve their patients' quality of life. Through cutting-edge innovations and clinically-relevant 
software solutions, we support healthcare professionals in setting new standards of care in 
ophthalmology/optometry; neuro, ENT, spine, dental and gynecologic surgery; and intraoperative radiotherapy. 
Comet Holding AG: The COMET Group is a globally leading Swiss technology firm. For nearly 70 years, we 
have been developing and producing innovative high-tech components and systems based on x-ray, radio 
frequency and ebeam technology. Consistently able to take advantage of global trends and developments, we grow 
continually. 
Osram Light AG: Osram Licht AG manufactures lights. The Company produces lamps, light-emitting diodes 
(LEDs), light engines, lighting management systems, specialty lighting, indoor and outdoor LED luminaires, 
dimmers, and other related lighting products. 
Alimak Group AB: he Group has been a pioneer and an industry leader in supplying elevators, hoists and work 
platforms based on rack-and-pinion technology for almost 70 years. Alimak has a broad and competitive product 
range of vertical access solutions, such as hoists, elevators and building maintenance units (BMU´s). 
Alfa Laval AB:  Alfa Laval is today a world leader within the key technology areas of heat transfer, separation 
and fluid handling. Our company was founded on a single brilliant invention and innovation remains at the heart 
















Exhibit 22 – Royal Philips (before IPO) Peers Overview 
 
Siemens AG: Siemens is a global powerhouse focusing on the areas of electrification, automation and 
digitalization. One of the world’s largest producers of energy-efficient, resource-saving technologies, Siemens is 
a leading supplier of systems for power generation and transmission as well as medical diagnosis. In infrastructure 
and industry solutions the company plays a pioneering role. 
General Electric Co: General Electric Company is a globally diversified technology and financial services 
company. The Company's products and services include aircraft engines, power generation, water processing, and 
household appliances to medical imaging, business and consumer financing, and industrial products. 
3M Co: 3M Company conducts operations in electronics, telecommunications, industrial, consumer and office, 
health care, safety, and other markets. The Company businesses share technologies, manufacturing operations, 
marketing channels, and other resources. 3M serves customers worldwide. 
ABB Ltd: ABB Limited provides power and automation technologies. The Company operates under segments that 
include power products, power systems, automation products, process automation, and robotics. 
Atlas Copco AB: Atlas Copco AB is an international industrial group. The Company develops, manufactures, and 
markets compressed air equipment and treatment, vacuum solutions, mining equipment, generators, electric and 
Data from 31/12/2015
(in million euros except share price) EBITDA Market Cap EV Price Debt
Siemens AG 8,590 79,184 97,296 90 31,127
General Electric Co 10,788 270,559 389,906 29 181,853
3M Co 7,556 85,359 93,560 139 9,936
ABB Ltd 3,803 38,487 40,089 17 6,818
Atlas Copco AB 2,604 27,323 28,824 23 2,501
Fanuc Corp 1,787 32,989 26,718 160 0
Schneider Electric SE 3,206 30,886 35,708 53 7,549
Emerson Electric Co 3,977 28,672 32,200 44 6,118
Kone Corp 1,342 20,580 20,305 39 237
Roper Technologies Inc. 1,111 17,607 19,901 175 3,011
LG Electronics 2,490 6,849 12,617 42 6,867
Motorola Solutions Inc 1,031 11,122 13,312 63 4,002
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd 37,724 144,376 97,197 980 10,015
Revenue Beta Tax
(in million euros except share price) EBIT Earnings Revenues Growth Levered Rate
Siemens AG 6,041 7,282 75,636 6.2% 1.04 15%
General Electric Co 8,426 -5,523 103,816 18.3% 1.07 35%
3M Co 6,262 4,357 27,292 13.8% 1.09 35%
ABB Ltd 2,758 1,742 31,974 6.5% 1.06 9%
Atlas Copco AB 2,139 1,252 10,578 2.7% 1.22 22%
Fanuc Corp 1,628 1,206 4,707 -10.6% 0.79 24%
Schneider Electric SE 2,229 1,407 26,640 6.8% 1.24 33%
Emerson Electric Co 3,476 2,366 14,186 8.5% 1.24 35%
Kone Corp 1,242 1,032 8,647 17.9% 0.83 20%
Roper Technologies Inc. 927 628 3,230 20.7% 1.06 35%
LG Electronics 950 99 45,026 6.6% 0.94 22%
Motorola Solutions Inc 896 550 5,134 15.8% 0.35 35%
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd 21,046 14,896 159,880 8.3% 1.47 22%
Source: Bloomberg, Reuters, Deloitte
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pneumatic tools, and hybrid joining technologies and other assembly systems, as well as offers related equipment 
and services. 
Fanuc Corp: FANUC Corporation manufactures factory automation (FA) systems, equipments, and robots. The 
Company's products include computerized numerically-controlled (CNC) equipment, servo motors, laser systems, 
industrial robots, wire-cut electric discharge machines, and CNC drill. 
Schneider Electric SE: Schneider Electric SE manufactures power distribution and automation systems. The 
Company produces circuit breakers, remote installation management equipment, panelboards, programmable logic 
controllers, industrial control products, detectors, human-machine interfaces, and process controls. Schneider's 
products are sold various brands. 
Emerson Electric Co: Emerson Electric Co. designs and manufactures electronic and electrical equipment, 
software, systems, and services. The Company offers its products for industrial, commercial, and consumer 
markets worldwide through its network power, process management, industrial automation, climate technologies, 
and commercial and residential solutions divisions. 
Kone Corp: KONE, Inc. designs, manufactures, and supplies elevators, escalators, autowalks, and automatic 
building doors. The company offers passenger, patient/service, freight, marine, and trauma elevators; and loading 
docks, automated guided vehicles, and destination control systems. It also provides maintenance and 
modernization solutions, and repairs and upgrades. 
Roper Technologies Inc: Roper Technologies, Inc. manufactures and distributes industrial equipment. The 
Company offers industrial controls, fluid handling, pumps, medical and scientific devices, analytical 
instrumentation products, radio frequency identification (RFID) communication technology, and software 
solutions. 
LG Electronics: LG Electronics Inc. manufactures and markets digital display equipment and home appliances. 
The Company produces and markets flat panel televisions, A/V products, washing machines, air conditioners and 
refrigerators as well as telecommunications equipment such as smart phones and tablets. 
Motorola Solutions Inc: Motorola Solutions, Inc. is a data communications and telecommunications equipment 
provider. The Company develops data capture, wireless, infrastructure, bar code scanning, two-way radios, and 
wireless broadband networks. Motorola also produces public safety and government products, voice and data 
communications products and systems, and wireless LAN securities. 
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. manufactures a wide range of consumer and industrial 
electronic equipment and products such as semiconductors, personal computers, peripherals, monitors, televisions, 
and home appliances including air conditioners and microwave ovens. The Company also produces Internet access 





















In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending 2013 2014 2015
Cash from Operating Activities
  + Net Income 168 -22 226
  + Depreciation & Amortization 390 381 315
  + Non-Cash Items -62 152 -33
  + Chg in Non-Cash Work Cap -232 -34 209
  + Net Cash From Disc Ops 0 0 0
Cash from Operating Activities 264 477 717
Cash from Investing Activities
  + Change in Fixed & Intang -178 -123 -85
  + Net Change in LT Investment 0 0 0
  + Net Cash From Acq & Div 0 -125 -11
  + Other Investing Activities 0 0 31
  + Net Cash From Disc Ops 0 0 0
Cash from Investing Activities -178 -248 -65
Cash from Financing Activities
  + Dividends Paid 0 0 0
  + Cash From (Repayment) Debt -2 -1 -12
  + Cash (Repurchase) of Equity -95 -200 -626
  + Other Financing Activities 0 0 0
  + Net Cash From Disc Ops 0 0 0








In Millions of EUR except Per Share
12 Months Ending
Revenue 7,129 100% 6,981 100% 7,465 100%
  BG Professional 2,301 32% 2,407 35% 2,732 37%
  BG Lamps 3,557 50% 3,119 45% 2,850 38%
  BG LED 772 11% 958 14% 1,334 18%
  BG Home 490 7% 482 7% 513 7%
  Others 9 15 36
EBITDA 603 100% 422 100% 646 100%
  BG Lamps 690 99% 474 92% 492 72%
  BG Professional 80 12% 93 18% 169 25%
  BG LED -1 0% 11 2% 86 13%
  Others -92 -96 -42
  BG Home -74 -11% -60 -12% -59 -9%
Operating Margin — — —
  BG Lamps 18 13 16
  BG LED 0 -5 6
  BG Professional 1 1 4
  BG Home -28 -12 -10
Organic Growth — — —
  BG LED — 26 27
  BG Home — 0 0
  BG Professional — 3 -1
  BG Lamps — -10 -16
Restructuring Charges 79 100% 261 100% 90 100%
  BG Professional 22 29% 41 18% 26 28%
  BG Lamps 21 28% 154 69% 52 55%
  BG Home 33 43% 22 10% 14 15%
  BG LED 0 5 2% 2 2%
  Others 3 39 -4
Capital Expenditures -159 -109 -98
  Others -42 -23 -10
  BG Home -4 3% -6 7% -11 13%
  BG LED -15 13% -12 14% -16 18%
  BG Professional -52 44% -30 35% -29 33%





Exhibit 25 – Philips Lighting Sales per geographic cluster (2011-2015) 
 
 
Source: Royal Philips Annual Report 2015 
Exhibit 26 – Lighting Market M&A deals 
 
 






Date Target Target Description Buyer Size EV/EBITDA
Manufactures lighting fixtures for residential customers, shops, 
showrooms, and galleries. Products include suspensions, ceiling 
lamps, wall lamps, systems projectors, downlights, and opal lighting 
Dec-15 Exenia S.r.l. Lumenpulse Inc. $12 8.63





Manufactures architectural LED lighting products for commercial 
and institutional spaces, such as office, education, and healthcare
Fluxwerx 
Illumination Inc.
Mar-16 $48 11.48Lumenpulse Inc.
Turnkey services provider in lighting controls, addressing energy 
savings projects within the commercial, industrial, hospitality, retail, 
education, and municipal sectors. Lighting portfolio includes 
recessed, linear suspended, asymetric, surface (ceiling), surface 
(wall),pendant, and perimeter lighting products as well as LED 
lighting products












Analysts predict worse results 
























TN Exhibit 1 – WACC and ROIC calculations 
 
 










Market Value of Equity
Shares Outstanding*Share Price € 21,606,970,240
Market Value of Debt
Book Value of Debt (interest bearing) € 5,760,000,000
Interest Expenses (Coupon) € 271,000,000
Average Maturity (t) 12.41
Market Value of Debt = C *((1-1/(1+Rd)^t)/Rd)+(Book Debt/(1+Rd)^t)






Ru Comparison to WACC (the alternative method)
B unlevered -> Weighted average by market cap of all the unlevered betas of the competitors
Calculate the unlevered betas
Bu = BL/(1+(1-Tc)*(D/E)) Assumed to be in market values 
Data from 31/12/2015
Beta Tax Beta 
(in million euros except share price) Levered Rate Debt Market Cap Unlevered
Siemens AG 1.04 15% 31,127 79,184 0.78
General Electric Co 1.07 35% 181,853 270,559 0.74
3M Co 1.09 35% 9,936 85,359 1.01
ABB Ltd 1.06 9% 6,818 38,487 0.91
Atlas Copco AB 1.22 22% 2,501 27,323 1.14
Fanuc Corp 0.79 24% 0 32,989 0.79
Schneider Electric SE 1.24 33% 7,549 30,886 1.07
Emerson Electric Co 1.24 35% 6,118 28,672 1.09
Kone Corp 0.83 20% 237 20,580 0.82
Roper Technologies Inc. 1.06 35% 3,011 17,607 0.95
LG Electronics 0.94 22% 6,867 6,849 0.53
Motorola Solutions Inc 0.35 35% 4,002 11,122 0.28
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd 1.47 22% 10,015 144,376 1.39
Bu 0.94
Ru = Rf+Bu*MRP 6.86%
Alternative WACC formula through Ru:
WACC = Ru*(1-Tc*D/(D+E)) WACC 6.23%
ROIC (values in €millions)
ROIC = (Op. Income*(1-t))/(NWCR+Fixed Assets)
NWCR= Op. Assets-Op. Liabilities
Operating Income € 1,111
Op. Assets € 12,693
Op. Liabilities € 8,403








Beta Tax Beta 
(in million euros except share price) Levered Rate Debt Market Cap Unlevered
Acuity Brands Inc 1.44 35% 315 9,389 1.41
Fagerhult AB 0.99 22% 146 661 0.84
Zhejiang Yankon Group  Co 0.48 25% 67 1,811 0.47
Osram Licht AG 0.90 15% 112 4,061 0.88
Zumtobel Group AB 1.30 25% 216 1,013 1.12
Thorpe 0.30 20% 0 389 0.30
Dalian Insulator Group 0.56 25% 40 521 0.53





Share price € 20.50
# Shares Outstanding 150,000,000
Market Value of Equity € 3,075,000,000
To reach market value, one assumes the average value the IPO 







Market Value of Debt
Book Value of Debt (interest bearing) € 88,000,000
Interest Expenses (Coupon) € 5,000,000
Average Maturity (t) 1.26
Market Value of Debt = C *((1-1/(1+Rd)^t)/Rd)+(Book Debt/(1+Rd)^t)
Market Value of Debt € 90,975,595




ROIC (values in €millions)
ROIC = (Op. Income*(1-t))/(NWCR+Fixed Assets)
NWCR= Op. Assets-Op. Liabilities
Operating Income € 195
Op. Assets € 2,784
Op. Liabilities € 2,104








Beta Tax Beta 
(in million euros except share price) Levered Rate Debt Market Cap Unlevered
GN Store Nord 0.80 24% 314 2,724 0.74
Draegerwerk AG & Co 0.77 15% 354 1,134 0.61
Guerbet 0.50 33% 342 794 0.39
Elekta AB 0.96 22% 538 3,003 0.84
Carl Zeiss Meditec AG 0.41 15% 13 2,321 0.41
Comet Holding AG 1.27 9% 20 518 1.23
Osram Light AG 0.90 15% 112 4,061 0.88
Alfa Laval AB 1.12 22% 1,597 7,073 0.95
Alimak Group AB 22% 89 403





Market Value of Equity € 18,531,970,240
To reach the Market Value of Equity, it will be assumed 
the difference between Royal Philips and Philips Lighting. 







It is going to be assumed the same assumption as used in Equity 
Market Value of Debt € 6,739,626,012




ROIC (values in €millions)
ROIC = (Op. Income*(1-t))/(NWCR+Fixed Assets)
NWCR= Op. Assets-Op. Liabilities
Operating Income € 683
Op. Assets € 9,909
Op. Liabilities € 6,299





TN Exhibit 2 – Philips Lighting Comparable Multiples 
 
 










(in million euros except share price) EBITDA Market Cap EBIT EV Price Earnings Sales
Acuity Brands Inc 364 9,389 325 9,017 215 192 2,337
Zumtobel Group AB 91 1,013 24 1,152 23 11 1,357
Osram Licht AG 543 4,061 338 3,400 39 166 3,572
(in million euros except share price) EV/EBIT EV/Sales EV/EBITDA P/E
Acuity Brands Inc 27.75 3.86 24.74 48.96
Zumtobel Group AB 48.38 0.85 12.61 89.09
Osram Licht AG 10.06 0.95 6.26 24.46
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Market Capitalization Range (in million€) 
 












(in million euros except share price) EBITDA Market Cap EBIT EV Price Earnings Sales
GN Store Nord 234 2,724 154 3,020 17 108 1,040
Draegerwerk AG & Co 158 1,134 73 1,271 69 25 2,609
Carl Zeiss Meditec AG 150 2,321 131 2,363 29 62 1,040
(in million euros except share price) EV/EBIT EV/Sales EV/EBITDA P/E
GN Store Nord 19.60 2.90 12.89 25.23
Draegerwerk AG & Co 17.34 0.49 8.07 45.29
Carl Zeiss Meditec AG 18.09 2.27 15.78 37.26
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